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To make fast and accurate behavioral choices, we need to integrate noisy sensory input,
take prior knowledge into account, and adjust our decision criteria. It was shown previously
that in two-alternative-forced-choice tasks, optimal decision making can be formalized in
the framework of a sequential probability ratio test and is then equivalent to a diffusion
model. However, this analogy hides a “chicken and egg” problem: to know how quickly we
should integrate the sensory input and set the optimal decision threshold, the reliability of
the sensory observations must be known in advance. Most of the time, we cannot know
this reliability without ﬁrst observing the decision outcome. We consider here a Bayesian
decision model that simultaneously infers the probability of two different choices and at
the same time estimates the reliability of the sensory information on which this choice is
based.We show that this can be achievedwithin a single trial, based on the noisy responses
of sensory spiking neurons. The resulting model is a non-linear diffusion to bound where
the weight of the sensory inputs and the decision threshold are both dynamically chang-
ing over time. In difﬁcult decision trials, early sensory inputs have a stronger impact on
the decision, and the threshold collapses such that choices are made faster but with low
accuracy. The reverse is true in easy trials: the sensory weight and the threshold increase
over time, leading to slower decisions but at much higher accuracy. In contrast to standard
diffusion models, adaptive sensory weights construct an accurate representation for the
probability of each choice.This information can then be combined appropriately with other
unreliable cues, such as priors. We show that this model can account for recent ﬁndings
in a motion discrimination task, and can be implemented in a neural architecture using fast
Hebbian learning.
Keywords: Bayesian, decisionmaking, uncertainty, adaptation, expectation-maximization, prior, evidence, decision
threshold
INTRODUCTION
Survival requires fast and accurate decisions in an uncertain and
continuously changing world. Unfortunately, our sensory input
is noisy, ambiguous, and unfolding across time. The outcome of
actions, such as reward or punishment, is also uncertain. As a
result, perceptual and motor decisions cannot be pre-deﬁned and
instantaneous. Instead, sensory evidence needs to be accumulated
over time and integrated with prior knowledge and reward predic-
tions. Decision making investigations address solutions adopted
by living organisms to solve two distinct but related problems:
faced with different choices, which one would yield the most
desirable outcome (“what to decide”)? In addition, since delaying
decisions allows more time for collecting information and increas-
ing choice accuracy, when should this decision be made (“when
to decide”)? Optimal decision strategies solve this time/accuracy
trade-off in order to maximize the rewards collected per unit of
time, i.e., the reward rate.
One of the most fundamental questions in the study of deci-
sion making is whether or not the strategies used by humans and
animals are optimal. Indeed, recent experimental and theoreti-
cal results suggest that humans use Bayes optimal strategies in a
wide variety of tasks (Doya, 2002; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Sugrue
et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006;Wolpert, 2007). In simple experimen-
tal regimes, such as a two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) task,
the optimal decision strategy can be described quantitatively as
an integration to threshold (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Ratcliff and
McKoon, 2008). In this framework, decision making is divided
into two successive stages: First, the inference stage accumulates
sensory evidence over time by computing the probabilities that
each choice is correct given past sensory observations (“what to
decide?”). Subsequently, a decision is made to commit to one of
the choices, when these probabilities have satisﬁed a given criteria
(“when to decide?”). This response criterion is critical because it
shapes the time/accuracy trade-off and controls the total reward
collected by the subject.
In certain contexts, Bayesian decision making is equivalent to
relatively simple decisionmechanisms such as the diffusionmodel.
However, in general, Bayesian methods lead to non-linear, non-
stationary models of integration and decision making (Behrens
et al., 2007;Deneve, 2008a,b;Mongillo andDeneve, 2008). In order
to solve a decision problem, a Bayesian integrator must constantly
adapt its decision making strategy to the statistical structure of
the task and the reward. Though simple to formulate, these proba-
bilistic decision problems can have solutions that are quite difﬁcult
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to analyze mathematically, and are computationally intractable.
Simplifying assumptions are required.
On the other hand, a major advantage of the Bayesian approach
is its adaptability and generalizability to situations where simpler
decision models would be suboptimal or not work (Doya, 2002;Yu
and Dayan, 2005; Behrens et al., 2007;Walton et al., 2007;Whiteley
and Sahani, 2008). Here we start from an extremely simple task (a
2AFC) where Bayesian decision making may be equivalent to the
diffusion model, but only if the probability distributions of sen-
sory inputs (i.e., the sensory likelihoods) are known in advance.
We then show than when these distributions are not known a pri-
ori (which is likely to be the case in realistic decision tasks) enough
information can be extracted from the sensory input (in the form
of sensory neuron spike trains) to estimate the precision of the
sensory input on-line and adapt the decision strategy accordingly.
This has strong consequences for the decision mechanisms. In
particular, it predicts that in hard decision tasks, the sensory input
is weighted more strongly during early stimulus presentation. The
inﬂuence of sensory input decays later, implying that a choice is
made based on prior knowledge and the earliest sensory observa-
tions, not on the latest sensory inputs preceding the decision, as
one might initially think. On the contrary, in easy trials, sensory
weights increase, and the latest sensory inputs are most predic-
tive of the subject’s decision. This framework also predicts that the
decision threshold (i.e., the amount of integrated sensory evidence
deemed necessary to commit to a choice) is not ﬁxed but evolves as
a functionof time and the sensory input: for hard tasks, this thresh-
old collapses, forcing a decision within a limited time frame; for
easy tasks, this threshold increases, i.e., decisions are made with
higher accuracy at the cost of slightly longer reaction times.
We present simulations of a decision task implementation that
has been very inﬂuential in the study of decision making in human
and non-human primates. We compare the Bayesian decision
maker with a diffusion model, and show that while both mod-
els predict similar trends for the mean reaction time and accuracy,
the Bayesian model also predicts some strong deviations from
the diffusion model predictions consistent with observations of
behaving monkeys trained at this task (Shadlen et al., 1996; Gold
and Shadlen, 2003; Mazurek et al., 2003; Palmer et al., 2005).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SEQUENTIAL PROBABILITY TEST
Consider a 2AFC between two possible responses, “A” or “B.”
This decision needs to be made based on an on-going, noisy
stream of sensory data. We can express all the sensory information
received up to time t as an unfolding sequence of sensory inputs,
So→ t = {s0, sdt, . . ., st − dt } where st is the sensory input received
between time t and t + dt. Let us suppose that correct choices
are rewarded, while incorrect choices are not. How could subjects
adjust their decision strategies in order to maximize their total
expected reward? This problem can be separated into an inference
stage and decision stage.
Inference
The inference stage corresponds to a temporal integration of sen-
sory evidence in order to compute the probability that each of
the choices is correct. Using the sequential probability ratio test
(Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008), the log odds for choices A and B is
computed recurrently as:
Lt = log
(
P (A|so→t )
P (B|so→t )
)
= log
(
P (A|so→dt ) P (st |A)
P (B|so→t ) P (st |B)
)
= Lt−dt + l (st )
By taking the limit for small temporal steps dt, we get
∂L
dt
= l (st ) (1)
where l(st)= log(P(st |A)/P(st |B)) is the log likelihood ratio
for the sensory input received at time t, and the starting point
of integration corresponds to the prior probability of choices
Lo = log(P(A)/P(B)) – for example, Lo = log(2) when A is a priori
twice more likely than B (Gold et al., 2008).
Of course, this requires that the likelihoods P(st |A) and
P(st |B) are known. These likelihoods capture the selectivity and
variability of sensory responses. Their relative values describe the
reliability of the sensory input at time t. Therefore, if the sensory
input likelihood is much larger for choiceA than for choice B, then
this input will strongly support choice A opposed to choice B.
To illustrate this, let us consider a decision based on the noisy
spike train of a singlemotion-sensitive, direction-selective neuron.
In this simple decision task, the two alternative choices are between
the stimulus moving in the preferred direction of this neuron
(choice A) and the opposite, anti-preferred direction (choice B).
The sensory input st corresponds to the spike train of the neuron,
i.e., a temporal binary stream of 1 or 0 (depending on whether
a spike is emitted or not at time t ). We suppose that the base-
line ﬁring rate q is increased to q + dq in the preferred direction,
and decreased to q − dq in the anti-preferred direction. Therefore,
q + dq and q − dq describe the likelihood of a sensory spike given
choice A and choice B, respectively.
The initial log odd ratio at the start of the trial is set to Lo = 0,
indicating that the two stimulus directions occur with the same
prior probability. The likelihood ratio is given by
lt = st log
(
q + dq
q − dq
)
+ (1 − st ) log
(
1 − (q + dq) dt
1 − (q − dq) dt
)
In the limit of small dt, and if the change in ﬁring rate induced
by the stimulus is small compared to the baseline ﬁring rate, i.e., if
dq ≈ q, the inference equation can be simpliﬁed to
∂Lt
dt
= w (st − q)
where st − q corresponds to the sensory evidence at time t and the
sensory weight is set by the input signal-over-noise ratio (SNR)
w = 2dq/q. The log odds Lt represent the current conﬁdence in
choice A relative to choice B. It increases on average if the input
ﬁring rate is above baseline, and decreases on average if the input
ﬁring rate is below baseline. However, this accumulation is noisy
due to the Poisson variability of the sensory spike train. Three
example trials are plotted in Figure 1A.
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A B
FIGURE 1 | “Bayesian” diffusion model. (A) Log odd ratios Lt as a function
of time in the trial (t =0: start of sensory stimulation) on three different trials.
Dashed lines correspond to the decision thresholds. Red plain line: a correct
trial where “choice A” was made (i.e., the upward threshold was reached
ﬁrst), and choice “A” was indeed the correct choice. Blue plain line: another
correct trial where choice B was made (the lower decision threshold was
reached ﬁrst) and B was indeed the correct choice. Dotted blue line: an error
trial where choice “A” was made while choice “B” would have been the
correct choice. (B) Optimal decision thresholds as a function of the strength
of the modulation of input ﬁring rate by motion direction (dq).
Decision criteria
We can distinguish between two variants of the 2AFC task lead-
ing to two different decision strategies (Mazurek et al., 2003). In
“reaction time” tasks, subjects observe the sensory input and are
required to respond as soon as they feel ready to do so. In “ﬁxed
delay” tasks, subjects observe the sensory input presented for a
ﬁxed duration. They indicate their choice only after a “go” signal,
and thus cannot control the decision time.
In “ﬁxed delay” tasks, the optimal decision strategy simply con-
sists of measuring the sign of the log odds at the end of stimulus
presentation. If the log odds is positive, choice A is more probable
than choice B, and vice versa. Going for the most probable choice
will maximize the probability of getting rewarded on each trial.
For “reaction time” tasks, the optimal strategy is a little more
complicated. The log odds ratio indicates the on-line probability
of making a correct choice if one choosesA ahead of B. If we decide
on option A when the log odds ratio crosses a positive threshold D
and decide on option B when it crosses a negative threshold −D
(see Figure 1A), then the probability of making the correct choice
will be given by PD = exp(D)/1+ exp(D).
However, the decision threshold also controls the duration of
the trial, since it takes longer to reach a higher threshold. The
time/accuracy trade-off can be optimized by setting D to a value
that maximizes the total amount of reward collected per unit of
time – the reward rate. The optimal decision threshold depends on
the details of the experimental protocol. If, for example, a reward
is provided only for correct choices, and each trial is followed by a
ﬁxed inter-trial interval, the total reward rate is given by
RR (D) = PD
RTD + Titi (2)
where RTD is the mean reaction time, that is, the time it takes
on average for Lt to reach either D or −D (Ratcliff and McK-
oon, 2008). To estimate RTD, we approximate the Poisson noise
in the cumulated spike counts by white Gaussian noise with vari-
ance equal to the mean. The mean ﬁrst passage time (i.e., reaction
time) is then RTD ≈D/(l tanh(D)), where l = 2wdq is the average
log likelihood ratio of the sensory input, or, equivalently, the aver-
age slope of Lt. In analogy with diffusion models, l corresponds to
the “drift rate.”
The optimal threshold is a function of the sensory likelihoods
and a solution to dRR/dD = 0.
The optimal threshold increases with the sensory reliability, as
deﬁned by the SNRw = 2dq/q. If the input is very reliable, accurate
decisions can be made very quickly. Thus, the optimal threshold
is high. If, on the other hand, reliabilities and sensory weights are
low, reaching high choice accuracy would be very costly in terms
of reaction time. In this case, the optimal threshold is low. Below
a certain drift rate, waiting to make a decision is not worth the
additional gain in accuracy, and the optimal threshold is zero:
decisions should be made immediately, without waiting for the
sensory input, resulting in a randomchoicewith accuracyPD = 0.5
and reaction time RTD = 0. The optimal boundary as a function
of the sensory “contrast” dq is plotted on Figure 1B.
This Bayesian approach is different from descriptive models of
decision making such as the race model or the diffusion model
(Laming, 1968; Link, 1992; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). These
models were not initially derived from principles of optimality,
but from the requirement of capturing human behavior with the
simplest possible models. Interestingly, however, these decision
mechanisms are equivalent to Bayesian decision making in spe-
ciﬁc contexts. For example, the parameters of a diffusion model
can be adjusted to be equivalent to Bayesian optimal decision in
2AFC tasks when the sensory likelihoods are Gaussians (Ratcliff
and McKoon, 2008). The diffusion model ﬁrst integrates a noisy
signal (analogous to the “inference stage” in the Bayesian frame-
work), and takes a decision when the integrator reaches one of two
possible bounds (analogous to the optimal criteria D). Variants
of diffusion models have been shown to successfully reproduce
human and animal behavior in 2AFC tasks (Ferguson, 1967; New-
some et al., 1989; Yuille and Bülthoff, 1996; Mazurek et al., 2003;
Ratcliff et al., 2003; Palmer et al., 2005;Ratcliff andMcKoon,2008).
While they share similar mechanisms with diffusion mod-
els, Bayesian decision models have the advantage of being more
constrained by the experimental protocol and the sensory noise.
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In a diffusion model, the drift rate, the threshold, and the starting
point of the integration are all free parameters that can be adjusted
to ﬁt experimental data. In a Bayesian model, these are constrained
respectively by the prior probabilities of the choice, the likelihoods
of the sensory input, and the reward schedule. These parameters
are either ﬁxed by the experimental protocol (such as the prior) or
can be estimated separately (such as the sensory reliabilities).
Unfortunately, an important disadvantage of the Bayesian
framework is that the likelihood ratio of the sensory input l(st)
needs to be known at the start of the trial. In other words, subjects
need to know exactly what sensory signals and noise to expect for
each of the choices. Without this knowledge, the optimal bound-
ary, the sensory weight and consequently, the drift rate cannot be
set. Most past models of decision making did not consider the pos-
sibility that the sensory likelihoods could be adjusted on-line as a
function of the sensory input. Instead, the threshold and drift rate
were assumed to be independent of sensory observations. Thus,
the parallel between diffusion models and Bayesian decision mak-
ing remained essentially qualitative. However, we show below that
sensory reliabilities can in fact be estimated within the timescale
of the decision itself. Therefore, the parameters of the decision
process can be adjusted on-line to better approximate Bayesian
decision making within the duration of a single trial.
ESTIMATING SENSORY LIKELIHOODS ON-LINE
Sensory likelihoods are determined not only by the sensory noise,
but also by the nature of the decision task. For example, cate-
gorization tasks result in very different likelihoods compared to
discrimination tasks. Most of the decisions we make everyday
occur in a unique context that will never be repeated. As a result,
sensory likelihoods generally cannot be derived purely from past
experience. For example, consider the choice between investing in
one of two different stock options. If stock option “A” suddenly
rises and stock option “B” falls, this could be due to a higher yield
of option “A,” or just random ﬂuctuations in the stock market.
We will never know what to make of this observation without
accumulating enough experience on the reliability of stock prices.
However, in order to maximize the outcome, we should evaluate
the reliability of market ﬂuctuations at the same time that we accu-
mulate evidence, thus making our investment as early as possible.
Is this realistic?
There is an equivalent problem in 2AFC tasks. Usually, these
protocols inter-mix trials with various levels of difﬁculties in order
to measure psychophysical curves. For example, subjects could be
asked to decide between two directions of motion, while varying
the level of noise in the motion display (Shadlen and Newsome,
1998), or to do a categorization task, while varying the distance
between the test stimulus and the category boundary (Ratcliff et al.,
2003). In these protocols the“quality”of the sensory input (i.e., the
sensory likelihood ratio) is not known at the start of a trial. In our
toy model, varying task difﬁculties would correspond to changes
in the sensory “contrast”dq, which affects the sensory weights and
optimal boundary for decision making (Figure 1B).
For example, let us suppose that the task difﬁculty in our toy
example is varied by controlling the amount of noise in the visual
motion stimulus. This can be done by using motion displays com-
posed of moving dotswhile varying the proportion of dotsmoving
coherently in a single direction, with the rest of the dots moving
in random directions (Britten et al., 1992). The proportion of dots
moving coherently corresponds to the “motion coherence.” These
kind of stimuli have been used intensively to investigate the neural
basis of decision making in humans and non-human primates.
They induce responses in direction-selective sensory neurons (e.g.,
in the medio-temporal area MT) that can roughly be described by
an increase or decrease of the background ﬁring rate by an amount
proportional to motion coherence (Newsome et al., 1989; Britten
et al., 1992). Schematically, the ﬁring rate of the sensory neuron is
q + cdq for choice A, and q − cdq for choice B, where c is a func-
tion of motion coherence (see Figure 2A). The sensory weights
and the bounds should be updated accordingly. But how can this
happen when trials with high and low coherences are randomly
intermixed?
There are two possible approaches to addressing this issue: one
is to set a “compromise” between the different levels of coherence
by using a ﬁxed sensory weight and a ﬁxed threshold. Alternatively,
one could attempt to estimate the coherence on-line, adjusting the
sensory weight, and the bound on-line during trial.
Motion coherence inﬂuences the ﬁring rate of sensory neurons,
and therefore, can be estimated from the sensory input at the same
time as the direction of motion. Using the Bayes theorem, we can
compute the joint probability of both contrast and choice, P(A,
c | so → t ) and P(B, c | so → t ), based on augmented sensory like-
lihoods; let us call x the unknown direction of motion, with x = 1
for direction A and x = 0 for direction B. To compute the joint
probability of all choices and coherence Pt(x, c)= P(x, c | so → t ),
we use the sensory likelihood
1
dt P(st = 1|x , c) = q + (2x − 1)cdq, resulting in the following
recurrent equation:
Pt (x , c) = 1
Z
Pt−dt (x , c)
(
q + cdq)xst (q − cdq)(1−x)st
× (1 − (q + cdq)dt )x(1−st )(1 − (q − cdq)dt )(1−x)(1−st ),
where Z is a normalization term. An estimate of contrast
can be obtained by computing its expected value cˆt =∑
c c(P(A, c |so→t ) + P(B, c |so→t )), while the probability for
choice A is given by marginalizing over all possible coherence
values P(A | so → t )=ΣcP(A, c | so → t ).
The temporal evolution of the estimated coherence and the
choice probability are plotted for two motion coherence values in
Figure 2B. Observe that the coherence estimate evolves on a sim-
ilar time scale than the choice probability. Consequently, sensory
weights and decision thresholds based onmotion coherence could,
in theory, be adjusted during the time scale of a single decision
trial.
However, implementing the full Bayesian integration algorithm
requires the accumulation of evidence for all possible combina-
tions of coherence and choice. This is considerablymore computa-
tionally intensive than a diffusion model, and it is unclear how this
could be implemented in a neural architecture. Instead, we con-
siderably simplify the computation using approximate Bayesian
optimal decision making, by separately estimating the reliability
of the sensory input and the choice probability. By integrating the
sensory input, we extract an on-line estimate of coherence cˆ(t ).
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FIGURE 2 | Bayesian decision making with varying levels of
motion coherence. (A) Firing rate of the model sensory neuron in
response to motion stimuli (start of stimulation marked by upward
pointing arrow) for different levels of coherence. Plain lines: stimulus is
in the preferred direction. Dashed lines: stimulus is in the anti-preferred
direction. The gray scale indicates the strength of motion coherence.
(B) Outcome of the “full” Bayesian integrator computing the joint
probabilities of all pairs of choices and coherences. Time 0 correspond
to the start of the trial. Plain black line: probability of choice A for
coherence c =0.2 (averaged over 20000 trials were A was the correct
choice). Plain gray line: probability of choice A for coherence c =0.05.
Dotted black line: expected value for motion coherence cˆ for true
coherence c =0.2. Dotted gray line: expected value for motion
coherence cˆ for true coherence c =0.05.
This estimate is used to adjust both the sensory weights and the
boundary on-line during the decision trial. This method is sub-
optimal, but still reaches higher levels of performance than ﬁxed
boundaries and ﬁxed sensory weights while requiring only one
additional sensory integrator.
To do this approximate inference, we use an on-line version of
the “Expectation Maximization” algorithm (Mongillo and Den-
eve, 2008). At each time step, we update the log odds Lt using the
current estimate of coherence:
∂L
dt
= cˆt w
(
st − q
)
(3)
These log odds provide us with an on-line estimate of motion
direction (or choice probability) xˆt = eLt /1 + eLt . We then esti-
mate the coherence by performing a stochastic gradient descent
on the log likelihood (see mathematical derivations):
1
η
dcˆ
dt
= −cˆ + 1
l
(
2xˆ − 1)w (st − q) , (4)
where l = 2(dq2/q) is the “default” drift rate for coherence c = 1.
The learning time constant η is a free parameter that controls
the amount of past observation used to estimate the coherence.
A short time constant provides rapidly adapted but highly vari-
able coherence estimates, while a long time constant provides less
variable, slower estimates. In practice, we adjusted η in order to
best approximate the mean dynamics of the coherence estimate
during exact inference (Figure 2B). An even better approximation
can be obtained by using a learning rate that decays as an inverse
of time (i.e., by implementing a running average). However, we
found that this has only a very minor impact on the reward rate or
dynamics of the weights and threshold. Therefore, we used a sim-
pler and more biologically plausible stochastic gradient descent
rule to update the coherence estimate on-line.
In order to estimate the optimal threshold, we deﬁne the func-
tion Dopt (c) as the maximal value between zero and the numerical
solution of
∂RR (c ,D)
dD
= 0,
with the reward rate deﬁned as
RR (c ,D) = PDD
c2l
tanh (D) + Titi
Here we used the fact that the mean drift rate for coherence c is
c2l. The time-varying optimal threshold is set on-line to Dopt (cˆ).
EXTENSION TO A POPULATION OF INPUT NEURONS
To test the predictions of the model in a biologically relevant set-
ting, we focused on a noisy motion integration task that has been
extensively used for studying the neural basis of decision making.
The task is the same as that in our toy example, except that the
decision is based on the activities of population of neurons rather
than a single spike train.
Subjects in these experiments were required to watch a stim-
ulus consisting of randomly moving dots and chose between two
opposite directionof motion (directionAor directionB). The level
of noise in the motion stimulus is controlled by the “coherence,”
that is, the proportion of dots moving coherently in direction A
or direction B. Motion coherence varied randomly from trial to
trial, so the subject did not know the coherence at the start of
the trial. The subjects indicated their choice by an eye movement
in the direction of perceived motion, and were rewarded for cor-
rect choices. In a “reaction time” version of this task, the subject
responded as soon as ready. In“ﬁxed delay”version of this task, the
stimulus is presented for a ﬁxed duration and the subjects respond
when prompted by a “go signal.”
A series of experimental studies withmacaquemonkeys trained
at this task showed that at least two brain areas are involved. In
particular, the role of the“sensory input” is played (at least in part)
by the medio-temporal area MT. Neural responses from area MT
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are integrated in the lateral intraparietal area LIP, a sensorimo-
tor brain area involved in the generation of eye movements. Thus
LIP is a potential candidate for a Bayesian integrator. However,
we focus here on the behavioral prediction of a Bayesian decision
model based on the sensory input from area MT.
The ﬁring rates of MT cells are modulated by the direction of
motion and by motion coherence. MT neurons have a background
response topurelynoisy visual displays (with zero coherence) anda
“preferred”direction of motion, i.e., their ﬁring rate will be higher
in response to motion in this direction and lower in the oppo-
site direction. To a ﬁrst approximation, if qi is the baseline ﬁring
of a MT cell, its ﬁring rate is qi + cdqi in the preferred direction,
and qi − cdqi in the anti-preferred direction, where c parameterize
motion coherence. To simplify notation, we suppose that the MT
population is balanced between the two directions of motions, i.e.,
Σidqi = 0.
As before, the log odds are computed as a weighted sum of
the spikes from the population of MT cells, gain modulated by an
on-line coherence estimate:
∂L
dt
= cˆt
∑
i
wi s
i
t (5)
The initial value for the log odds correspond to the prior odds:
Lo = log(P(A)/P(B)).
The on-line coherence estimate is obtained by a weighted aver-
age of motion coherence extracted from each spike train (see
mathematical derivations). This gives a single leaky integration
equation:
1
η
dcˆ
dt
= −cˆ + 1
l
(
2xˆ − 1)∑
i
wi si ,
where l = 4∑i dq2iqi is the drift rate for coherence 1. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that the “default” coherence is 1, i.e.,
integration starts at cˆ(0)= 1.
Finally, the optimal threshold is set as before at Dopt (cˆ).
We compare the predictions from the Bayesian decision model
with a diffusion model with ﬁxed sensory weights and a ﬁxed
threshold. This diffusion model is similar to a model previ-
ously used to account for behavioral and neurophysiological data
(Mazurek et al., 2003). The “integrated input” in the diffusion
model is:
dL¯
dt
=
∑
i
wi s
i
t (6)
The boundary is set at a ﬁxed level D¯, and the starting point
of integration (for each setting of the prior) is set at a ﬁxed value
L¯o . For easier comparison with the Bayesian decision model, D¯
was adjusted in order to achieve the same mean reaction time.
For each prior, L¯o was adjusted in order to reproduce the mean
response biases in the Bayesian model.
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
For the single neuron model, we used q = 200 Hz and dq = 20 Hz.
For the population model, we employed a population of 100 MT
neurons, with baseline ﬁring rate q = 10 Hz and modulation by
motion stimulus dq = 1 Hz (50 neurons) or dq =−1 Hz (50 neu-
rons). The time constant for coherence estimation was set to
1/η= 112 ms. Motion coherence was varied between 0 and 4. The
inter-trial interval T iti was set to 1 s.
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF THE COHERENCE ESTIMATE
We describe here the stochastic gradient descent method for esti-
mating the coherence c(t ) on-line. We do so in the case of a single
spike train. The generalization to a population of input neurons is
straightforward.
Standard “batch” expectation maximization would consist in
choosing a ﬁxed temporal window T, and then repeating the fol-
lowing procedure until convergence: First, compute the expected
motion direction xˆ(T ) given the current coherence estimate, then
update the coherence estimate by the value of c that optimizes
the log likelihoods (summed for all input s0→T in the temporal
window) given the current direction estimate. This is an off-line
method and thus biologically implausible. Instead,we performon-
line expectation maximization using stochastic gradient descent.
At each time step we update the coherence estimate using only the
current training example (input st) instead of the whole sequence
s0→T . Using regularization parameter η, coherence is updated
iteratively by the value of contrast that maximizes the sensory
likelihood. In discrete time, this corresponds to:
cˆt+dt = (1 − ηdt ) cˆt + ηdt〈s〉 c
s
i ,
where 〈s〉 is the frequency of observation st [qdt if st = 1 (1− qdt) if
st = 0] and cst is the value of coherence that maximizes the current
likelihood:
P(st |xˆ , c) = (q + cdq)xˆst (q − cdq)(1−xˆ)st (1 − (q + cdq)dt )xˆ(1−st )
(1 − (q − cdq)dt )(1−xˆ)(1−st ) (7)
Taking the limit dt → 0 and neglecting terms of higher order in dt
leads to the following differential equation:
1
η
dcˆ
dt
= −cˆ + (2xˆ − 1)
(
st − q
)
dq
From which it is straightforward to derive eq. 5.
FREE PARAMETERS IN THE DIFFUSION AND BAYESIAN MODELS
Here, our goal is to show that the Bayesian model reproduces qual-
itative trends in the data that are not captured by a diffusionmodel.
However, it is crucial to identify the free parameters (and thus, the
complexity) of both models if they are to be ﬁtted quantitatively
to behavioral data. Since the true sensory likelihoods q, dq, and
the modulation of ﬁring rate by each level of coherence c are not
observables in behavioral tasks, they would have to be ﬁtted to
the data for each model. In addition, our version of the diffusion
model has the following additional free parameters: the starting
point of integration for each priors L¯o and the decision threshold
D¯. The simpliﬁed Bayesian model has the following free parame-
ters: the initial coherence estimate cˆ(0) and the coherence estimate
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 75 | 6
Deneve Decisions with unknown sensory reliability
update rate η. Other parameters (dynamics of thresholds and sen-
sory weight, starting point of sensory integration) are imposed
by parameters of the task (e.g.,T iti, priors for choices P(A), P(B))
and approximate Bayesian inference equations. Our simplistic dif-
fusion model have thus at least as many free parameters as the
simpliﬁed Bayesian model.
More complex diffusionmodels can provide better ﬁts to exper-
imental data and capture some of these qualitative trends, but it
comes at the cost of additional free parameters, i.e., variability in
starting point of integration and drift rates (Ratcliff and McKoon,
2008), urgency signals (Hanks et al., 2011), or time-varying costs
for sensory integration (Drugowitsch et al., 2012).
RESULTS
DYNAMICS OF SENSORY WEIGHTS AND DECISION THRESHOLD
The sensory weight (i.e., the weight given to each new spike for
updating the log odds) is proportional to the coherence estimate.
Thus the sensory weight is a dynamic function of time and the
integrated sensory signal (see Figure 3A). At the start of the trial,
the coherence estimate is equal to the initial estimate c = 1. As
time increases, the coherence estimate converges to its true value.
When the true motion coherence is higher than 1, the sensory
weight increases over the duration of the trial. As a result, sen-
sory inputs have a larger impact on the log odds at the end of the
trial than at the beginning of trial. If, on the other hand, the true
coherence is lower than 1, the sensory weight decreases over the
duration of the trial. Thus, an input spike has a larger impact on
the log odds at the beginning of the trial than at the end.
The decision threshold also needs to be updated on-line, since
it depends on motion coherence. Figure 3B represents the average
temporal evolution of the log odds and optimal threshold, for two
levels of (true) motion coherence. Notice that the threshold fol-
lows the same trend than the sensory weight: it collapses for hard
tasks, but stays constant or increases moderately for easy tasks. The
effect of the collapsing bound at low contrast is to force a decision
within a limited time frame if the trial is too difﬁcult. In this case,
the cost of waiting longer to make a decision outweighs the ben-
eﬁt of improved accuracy. Collapsing bounds have indeed been
proposed as an upgrade for diffusion-based decision models with
varying levels of sensory input strength. In particular, approximate
Bayesian decision making predicts that a decision is not made at
a ﬁxed level of accuracy. Rather, the decision is made with a more
permissive threshold (i.e., at a lower conﬁdence level) when the
trial is more difﬁcult.
BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS
Simulated behavioral results are presented separately for“Reaction
time”and“Fixed delay” tasks. To investigate the effect of priors, we
either presented the two directions of motion with equal probabil-
ity (Lo = 0) or directionAwas presentedmore often than direction
B (Lo = 0.6) or vice-versa (Lo = −0.6).
Reaction time task
Psychophysical curves and reaction times as a function of motion
coherence and priors are plotted in Figure 4. While the psy-
chophysical curves are qualitatively similar for the diffusion model
and the Bayesian model (Figures 4A,B), the mean reaction times
(Figures 4C,D) and reaction time distribution (Figures 4E,F) are
notably different. In particular, RTs are shorter at low coherence
and larger at high coherence than expected from a diffusion model
(Figures 4C,D). This is mainly because for low coherence trials,
the on-line estimate of coherence tends to decrease the decision
threshold, thus shortening the reaction time. The reverse is true
at high coherence. As a consequence, the animal spends less time
on difﬁcult trials (they are not worth the wait), and more time on
easy trials (little extra-time result in a large increase in accuracy)
than would be predicted by a diffusion model.
While the reaction time distributions for a diffusion model are
very asymmetrical, with a fast rise and a long tail, the reaction
time distributions predicted by the Bayesian model are quasi-
symmetrical. The decision threshold is initially high, resulting in
an absence of very short reaction time. The collapsing bound also
prevents very long reaction times, which explains why the reaction
time distributions of the Bayesian model do not have long tails.
This occurs at all motion coherence levels even if, on average, the
threshold does not collapse at high coherence: Long trials corre-
spond to “bad trials”were the quality of the sensory input was low
(since the decision threshold was not crossed early). In these trials,
the estimated motion coherence is also low (even if true motion
coherence is high). The bound collapses, resulting in a shortening
FIGURE 3 | Simplified Bayesian model. (A) Sensory weights in the
simpliﬁed Bayesian model (average of 20000 trials) as a function of time
after stimulus presentation. Black line: c =2. Light gray line: c =0 (i.e.,
sensory input is pure noise). Dark gray line: c =1. (B) Average log odds Lt
(plain lines) and decision threshold (dashed lines) in the simpliﬁed
Bayesian model. These temporal proﬁles were obtained by averaging over
20000 trials. The decision variables and threshold on individual trials (as
well as the sensory weights) are varying randomly due to sensory noise
(e.g., see Figure 1A). Black lines: c =2 Dark gray lines: c =1. Light gray
lines: c =0.2.
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FIGURE 4 | Simplified Bayesian and “diffusion” decision model in the
“reaction time” task. (A) Proportion of choice A as a function of motion
coherence for the simpliﬁed Bayesian model. Positive coherence
corresponds to stimuli moving in direction (A), negative coherence to
stimuli moving in the opposite direction. Plain Lines: the two choices are
a priori equiprobable (Lo =0). Dashed line: (B) is a priori more probable
than A (Lo =−0.6). Dotted line: (A) is a priori more probable than B
(Lo =0.6). (B) Same as is (A), for the diffusion model. (C) Mean reaction
time as a function of motion coherence for the simpliﬁed Bayesian model.
Plain line: correct trial. Dashed line: error trials. (D) Same as in (C) for the
diffusion model. (E) Reaction time distribution for low coherence trials
(c =0.05). The frequency was estimated by counting the number of RT
observed over 20000 decision trials. Blue: Bayesian model. Red: diffusion
model. Plain: correct trials. Dashed: error trials. Error trials are presented
upside down for clarity. (F) Same as in (E) for high coherence trials
(c =0.3).
of the duration of these “bad trials,”which would have formed the
tail of the RT distribution in a diffusion model.
For the same reason, the Bayesian model predicts longer reac-
tion times for error trials than for correct trials (Figure 4C). In
contrast, a diffusion model would predict the same reaction time
for correct and error trials (Figure 4D). This is another conse-
quence of the correlation between the length of the trial and the
estimated coherence. In trials where the quality of the sensory
input is low (due to sensory noise) the threshold collapses and is
crossed at a lower value of accuracy. These “bad trials” have both
longer reaction times and lower accuracy.
The beneﬁt of using a Bayesian decision model is particularly
strong when it comes to incorporating prior knowledge with the
sensory evidence. By estimating motion coherence, the Bayesian
integrator can appropriately adjust the contribution of the sensory
evidence compared to its prior (see results from the ﬁxed delay
tasks). The diffusion model, on the other hand, over-estimates the
quality of the sensory input at low coherence and under-estimates
it at high coherence. Consequently, the overall effect of the prior
(as implemented by a bias in the starting point of integration) is
too weak at low coherence and too high at high coherence.
By adjusting the sensory weights and decision thresholds on-
line as a function of the coherence estimate, the Bayesian decision
model constantly re-evaluates the inﬂuence of the prior during the
entire duration of the trial. The effect of the prior is thus much
more than setting the starting point for sensory integration. In
particular, this can paradoxically make the prior appears as an
additional “sensory evidence,” as illustrated in Figure 5. While the
diffusion model (Figures 5A,B) starts integration at a level set by
the prior, but later behaves as a simple integrator, the inﬂuence
of the prior in the Bayesian model (Figures 5C,D) is ampliﬁed
during the trial. This strongly resembles a change in the drift rate,
as if the priors were in fact an additional “pseudo” motion signal.
Fixed delay tasks
During ﬁxed delay tasks, subjects see the stimulus for a ﬁxed dura-
tion and are required to respond only after presentation of a “go”
signal. Thus, in this case, there is no time/accuracy trade-off and
no need for a dynamic decision threshold. Instead, the decision is
determined by the sign of the log odds ratio at the end of stimulus
presentation.
In a diffusion model, all sensory inputs are taken equally into
account, regardless of whether they occur at the beginning or
at the end of stimulus presentation. By contrast, the Bayesian
decision model re-weights the sensory evidence as a function of
the estimated motion coherence, and thus, sensory inputs do not
all contributes equally to the ﬁnal decision. This is illustrated in
Figure 6A where we plotted the average sensory input (〈∑t wi sit 〉)
at different times during stimulus presentation, conditioned on
the fact that the ﬁnal choice was A. Here we consider only trials
with zero coherence, i.e., c = 0. In this case the decision is purely
driven by random ﬂuctuations in the sensory input. The curves are
a result of averaging over 20000 trials. The stimulus was presented
for 2000 ms and the decision was made at t = 2000 ms. Only trials
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FIGURE 5 | Simplified Bayesian model and “diffusion” model with
changing priors. (A) Average integrated input divided by the threshold
(L¯t/D) as a function of time in the diffusion model at low coherence
(c =0.2). Plain Lines: the two choices are a priori equiprobable (Lo =0).
Dashed line: B is a priori more probable than A (Lo =−0.6). Dotted line: A is
a priori more probable than B (Lo =0.6). In the diffusion model, the prior is
implemented by a constant offset of the decision variable, i.e., a different
starting point for integration. (B)The same as in (A) for medium motion
coherence (c =1). (C) Log odds divided by the decision threshold [i.e.,
L/Dopt (cˆ)] for the simpliﬁed Bayesian decision model at low coherence
(c =0.2). Dashed, dotted and plain lines correspond to different priors [same
as in (A)] (D). Same as (C) but for a high value of motion coherence (c =2).
resulting in choice A (L2000 > 0) were selected for averaging. For
a diffusion model (red), the curve is ﬂat and slightly above zero.
This is because positive inputs tend to increase the probability that
the ﬁnal log odds will be positive, and the ﬁnal choice will be “A.”
In a diffusion model, the order of arrival of these inputs does not
matter, resulting in a ﬂat curve. In contrast, the Bayesian decision
model (blue line) gives more conﬁdence to inputs presented early
in the trial. This is because the initial coherence estimate [cˆ(0)= 1]
is actually larger that the realmotion coherence (c = 0 in this case).
This results in the ﬁrst inputs being taken into account more so
than later inputs. As a consequence, the decision-triggered average
of the input decays over time.
A non-intuitive consequence of estimating motion coherence
on-line is to decrease the apparent temporal window of integra-
tion for the Bayesian decision model. For low coherence trials, the
initial input will inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision much more than it
should. Later in the trial, the inﬂuence of the input decays, but
can never completely overcome the initial bias produced by early
sensory noise. Consequently, integration is initially fast and later
slows down considerably, to a point where the decision accuracy
does not appear to beneﬁt much from longer stimulus presen-
tation (Figure 6B). This does not happen in a diffusion model,
where each sensory input is equally weighted at all time. For
long presentations of low coherence stimuli, the diffusion model
performs paradoxically better than a Bayesian model. This is a
consequence of approximate inference: coherence is estimated sep-
arately from motion direction, thus ignoring correlations between
the two estimates.
Finally, the diffusion model and the Bayesian model behave
very differently in the presence of priors. This is illustrated on
Figure 6C. At zero coherence trial, the inﬂuence of the prior is
very strong for short stimulus presentation, but decays for longer
stimulus presentation, even when the stimulus is pure noise. This
decay is not a desirable feature: the sensory input is completely
uninformative so the inﬂuence of prior information about the
choice should stay strong regardless of the length of stimulus pre-
sentation (the ideal strategy would be to always respond according
to the sign of the prior and completely ignore sensory informa-
tion). Unfortunately, this decay cannot be completely prevented if
one does not know initially that the coherence is zero. By dynam-
ically reweighing sensory evidence, the Bayesian decision model
can prevent this “washing away” of prior information by noise.
Once enough sensory information has been collected to bring
the coherence estimate to zero, it stops integrating the sensory
noise and relies only on the prior. The diffusion model, on the
other hand, keeps accumulating noise and quickly forgets the prior
information.
DISCUSSION
EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS
The Bayesian model predicts signiﬁcant deviation from the pre-
diction of a diffusion model when the precision of the sensory
input (or the task difﬁculty) is varied randomly from trial to trial.
Some of these predictions qualitatively ﬁt previous results.
Thus, we predict that the reaction times are slower for error
trials than correct trials, as shown in Figure 4C. This was indeed
reported experimentally (Mazurek et al., 2003).
The model also predicts quasi-symmetrical reaction time dis-
tribution, as shown in Figures 4E,F. Such quasi-symmetrical RT
distributions were observed in macaque monkeys performing this
motion discrimination task (Ditterich, 2006). This is one of the
most striking deviations of this behavior from the predictions of a
diffusion model. An “urgency signal” increasing the probability of
a choice with time during the trial has been proposed to account
for these data (Ditterich, 2006). The effect of the urgency signal is
similar to the effect of a collapsing bound.
The modulation by the prior resembles a pseudo “motion” sig-
nal, as shown in Figures 4C,D. Indeed, this was also reported
experimentally (Palmer et al., 2005;Hanks et al., 2011).Once again,
this data was attributed to a collapsing bound or an urgency signal
forcing faster decisions in low coherence trials (Palmer et al., 2005;
Hanks et al., 2011).
Finally, we predict that the inﬂuence of the sensory signal is
stronger early in the trial than later in the trial, as shown in
Figure 6A. Indeed, this effect is also observed inmonkeys perform-
ing the motion discrimination task in zero coherence trials (Kiani
et al., 2008). The decrease in sensory weights in low coherence
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FIGURE 6 | Simplified Bayesian and “diffusion” decision model in the
“fixed delay” task. (A) Choice-averaged inputs as a function of time in a
zero coherence trial (c =0). The noisy sensory input (i.e., the input spike
train st) was averaged in 10ms sliding time windows over 20000 trials.
Only trials were choice A was made after a 2 s stimulus presentation (i.e.,
L2000 >0) were used for this choice-triggered average. Blue line: simpliﬁed
Bayesian model. Red line: diffusion model. The diffusion model weights all
sensory inputs equally while the Bayesian model relies on inputs only early
in the trial. (B) Percent of correct choices as a function of the duration of
stimulus presentation. Plain blue line: Bayesian model at low coherence
(c =0.1). Dotted blue line: Bayesian model at higher coherence (c =0.5).
Plain red line: diffusion model at low coherence (c =0.1). Dotted red line:
Bayesian model at higher coherence (c =0.5). In contrast to the diffusion
model, the Bayesian model stops integrating early in the trial (i.e., the
probability of correct choice saturates whereas it keeps increasing for the
diffusion model). (C) Probability of choosing A in zero coherence trial
(c =0), with a prior favoring choice A (Lo =0.6), as a function of the
duration of stimulus presentation. Since the input is pure noise, optimal
strategy (if coherence was known) would be to always respond “A” (i.e.,
probability of choice A should be 1). The Bayesian model saturates to a
suboptimal but still high probability of choice A. In the diffusion model, the
inﬂuence of the prior decays over time.
trials limits the effective integration time window, causing satura-
tion of performance with longer stimulus presentation, as shown
in Figure 6B. Indeed, this was reported as well in the ﬁxed dura-
tion task (Kiani et al., 2008). The authors accounted for these data
by assuming that the animal reaches an internal decision bound
after which it stops integration until the “go signal” is provided.
We predict on the contrary that there is no “internal bound.” The
monkey stops integrating in low coherence trials as soon as it real-
izes that the sensory input in entirely unreliable. This should not
occur in high coherence trial.
Finally, a strong prediction of the adaptive Bayesian model is
that the effect of the prior will not “wash away” for longer presen-
tation times when the motion coherence is zero (Figure 6C), in
contrast to the decay in prior inﬂuence normally observed when
coherence is higher. To our knowledge, this prediction has not
been tested experimentally.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER BEHAVIORAL MODELS
Our model is not the ﬁrst variant of a diffusion model that
accounts for the observed animal behavior in the motion discrim-
ination task. Other models of decision making have focused on
proposing a biologically plausible neural basis for decision mech-
anisms (Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Kiani et al., 2008; Wang, 2008;
Churchland et al., 2011). They did not consider that the drift rate
of a diffusion process or the bound could be adjusted on-line
as a function of the sensory input. However, they share similar
mechanisms with Bayesian decision models, such as a decision
thresholds that collapses over time or, equivalently, an urgency
signal that increases over time (Ditterich, 2006). The “integra-
tion to bound” model (Kiani et al., 2008) assumes that sensory
integration takes place as in a diffusion model, but only until
the integrated evidence reaches an internal bound. No further
integration is performed after that. This could indeed account
for the stronger weight of sensory evidence at the beginning of
the trial and the saturation of performance for longer stimulus
duration.
One of the strongest motivations in building a Bayesian model
is to have the capability to not only extract a single estimate from
the sensory input (e.g., direction of motion) but also to extract the
uncertainty associated with this estimate. This is extremely useful
since this information can then be combined optimally with other
noisy sensory cues (Ernst and Banks, 2002) or used to compute
probabilistically optimal policies (Dayan and Daw, 2008). Unfor-
tunately, this is also costly. Uncertainties are harder to estimate
since they generally require much more data than a simple esti-
mate. Fortunately, biological spike trains are Poisson distributed to
a ﬁrst approximation. In a Poisson process, uncertainty is directly
reﬂected in the gain of the neural responses (Zemel et al., 1998).
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Uncertainty can then be relatively easy to extract, which is what
we exploited here.
Note that an even easier solution is available when both the
modulation of ﬁring rate (dq) as well as the baseline ﬁring rate (q)
are both equally gain modulated by certainty. For our toy model,
this could correspond to an effect of coherence corresponding
to multiplying both the dq and q by c. In this case, the sensory
weights are constant (independent of c) and the diffusion model
is exactly equivalent to a Bayesian decision model. This solution
has been proposed previously in the context of population coding,
in a variant of the motion discrimination task involving a continu-
ous direction estimate (Beck et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the ﬁring
rate modulation reported in MT during motion discrimination
tasks does not support this assumption. The baseline ﬁring rate
appears to be largely independent of motion coherence (Britten
et al., 1992).
Other solutions have also been proposed involving the use of
elapsed time rather than an explicit representation of the choice
probability (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Hanks et al., 2011). Indeed,
each level of integrated evidence and time during the trial can be
mapped to a particular level of accuracy for the sensory signal.
The predictions for the effect of priors are similar to ours and have
been shown to ﬁt experimental data (Hanks et al., 2011). Note,
however, that a policy based on elapse time is only useful if coher-
ence is constant during the whole duration of the trial and if the
“beginning”of sensory stimulation is clearly marked. This strategy
also assumes that“elapsed time” is directly available to the decision
maker. While this use of elapsed time could represent a strategy
learnt by highly trained subjects, it is not clear whether it could
be applied to “single shot” decision making or in the presence of
on-going sensory data whose reliability may vary, as in our stock
market example. Moreover these models cannot deal with sensory
signals starting and ending unpredictably. For example, a coher-
ent motion signal could suddenly appear in an initially random
motiondisplay.Our framework constantly adapts the sensory inte-
gration and decision strategy to the on-going sensory signal. It can
thus detect and properly respond to such events. Models based on
elapsed time could not do so, since the start of sensory integration
(time 0) cannot be inferred before the motion stimulus is actually
detected.
The trials for which the Bayesian model makes predictions that
are most notably different from previous models are the easy tri-
als, where coherence is high. In this case, our model predicts an
increase in sensory weights and a constant or slightly increasing
(not collapsing) decision threshold. This means in particular that
“motion pulses” would have more impact if given at the end of
the trial. This contrasts with zero coherence trials, where they have
more impact at the beginning of the trial than at the end (Kiani
et al., 2008). This suggests a simple ways of testing our theory
experimentally.
A recent approach used dynamic programming to model opti-
mal decision strategies under varying motion coherence (Dru-
gowitsch et al., 2012). This model maximized the reward rate by
estimating (for each time in the trial) the value of three possi-
ble actions: collecting more evidence, making choice A or making
choice B. This method is similar to the full Bayesian integration
algorithm, except that it replaces the joint probability distribution
over motion direction and coherence with a probability distrib-
ution over cumulated sensory evidence and time in the trial. It
can indeed reproduce the behavioral results with high accuracy,
in particular the RT distributions. However, in order to do so one
must assume an explicit cost to cumulating more sensory evi-
dence (rather than taking the decision immediately). This cost
varies with the time in the trial (i.e., a full temporal proﬁle for
the cost of cumulating evidence as a function of time is ﬁtted to
the data). This additional degree of freedom can capture many
deviations from what would be Bayesian optimal. Note that the
measured cost was initially stable at the beginning of the trial
then increased rapidly in both monkeys and humans (Drugow-
itsch et al., 2012). Rather than assuming a time-varying cost, we
propose instead that these deviations are a result of approximate
inference. Instead of computing the probability distribution over
all sensory likelihoods, which would in general be intractable, the
brain uses two coupled integrators separately estimating the sen-
sory precision and motion direction on-line. Whether our model
ﬁts behavior quantitatively (and not only qualitatively) will need
to be further investigated.
POSSIBLE NEURAL IMPLEMENTATION
An example of biologically plausible mechanisms for decision
making involves recurrent network models with two competing
populations of neurons receiving evidence for each direction of
motion (Wang, 2002, 2008; Wong and Wang, 2006). Parameters
can be adjusted to ensure a slow time constant of integration
during the sensory integration phase (line attractor), similar to
a diffusion process. The network eventually reaches a basin of
attraction, converging to one of two possible stable states, which
implement the threshold crossing and decision (Wong et al., 2007).
This is however not an instantaneous process. As the network
reaches the basin of attraction, it gradually loses its sensitivity to
the input, resulting in a decaying sensory input inﬂuence on the
ﬁnal decision, and, if in addition, both populations receive an on-
going background signal, an urgency signal or “collapsing bound”
could also be implemented.
Recurrent dynamics could indeed implement the decreasing
sensory weights and collapsing bound required in low coherence
trials. However, they cannot implement the increasing sensory
weights predicted in easy trials.Wenotice however, that the on-line
coherence estimate (and thus, the synaptic gain) can be under-
stood as fast Hebbian plasticity with a strong regularization term
(the decay η). More precisely, it is equivalent to the “BCM” rule
(Bienenstock et al., 1982) measuring covariance between pre and
post-synaptic activity. Here, we interpret the pre-synaptic input
as st (with mean q) and the post-synaptic activity as the proba-
bility of choice xˆt (with mean is 0.5). For example, fast Hebbian
plasticity between MT cells and LIP cells could implement such
mechanism in the motion integration task Therefore, local synap-
tic plasticity rules could provide an on-line estimate of sensory
precision, thereby gain-modulating the incoming sensory infor-
mation by its reliability at each level of the cortical processing
hierarchy,while recurrent network dynamics could implement the
collapsing bound. Note that if the decay η was replaced by a much
smaller learning rate and gain modulated by reward prediction
error, this rule would correspond to a reinforcement learning rule
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previously proposed to account for the improved performance of
monkeys learning coarse versus ﬁne motion discrimination tasks
(Law and Gold, 2009). This suggests that on-line changes in sen-
sory weights during a single decision trial could rely on neural
mechanism similar to those implementing perceptual learning at
a much slower time scale.
LIMITATIONS OF THE APPROACH
In order to avoid accumulating information for all combinations
of coherence and motion directions while proposing a biologically
plausible implementation, we separated the estimate of coher-
ence and the estimate of motion direction, thus implementing
approximate (not exact) inference. The cost of this approxima-
tion is the introduction of biases, e.g., a differential weighting of
sensory information at different moment of the trials. In the reac-
tion time task, the improvement acquired using an approximate
Bayesian framework is also moderate compare to an optimized
diffusion model (corresponding to an increase of about 5% in the
reward rate).
We also chose to concentrate on the inference stage (i.e., extract-
ing andusing sensory likelihoods to infer the probability of sensory
interpretations) rather than the decision stage (i.e., the threshold).
Our greedy method for setting the threshold to the value that
would be optimal if motion coherence was always (i.e., in all tri-
als) equal to its current estimate cˆt is naive and probably strongly
suboptimal. We suspect, however, that any efﬁcient policy based
on an on-line estimation of sensory likelihoods will result in qual-
itatively similar predictions, i.e., dynamic sensory weights and
thresholds.
Finally, RT distributions in humans performing the same
motion discrimination task are more non-symmetrical than mon-
key RT distributions, and are better ﬁtted by a diffusion model.
Moreover, the effect of priors in humans is well ﬁtted by a change
in the starting point of integration (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).
Note that in contrast to monkeys, there were no 0 coherence tri-
als in these human experiments, which may have decreased the
interest of using a collapsing bound (the collapsing bound essen-
tially prevents “guess” trials based on pure noise from taking too
long). In a more recent experiment including zero coherence trials,
evidence for an urgency signal was also found in human subjects
(Drugowitsch et al., 2012) albeit its exact inﬂuence on RT distrib-
utions is not shown. Moreover, it is unclear whether humans used
the same criteria for reward rate than monkeys performing for
juice reward.
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